

The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study

Experimental Instructions

The instructions are divided according to the stage (Introduction Stage, Play Stage and Payment Stage) and the role (trustees, or R players, and trusters, or E players).

[INTRODUCTION STAGE: R AND E PLAYERS]

Welcome to the Department of Economics. You are about to take part in an experimental study of decision making. You are not allowed to speak to other participants or communicate in any other way. If you want to ask a question, please put up your hand.

The experiment is in three stages, called the INTRODUCTION, STAGE 1 and STAGE 2. In Stages 1 and 2 you will be asked to make some decisions.

In the Introduction stage, we will explain the nature of the decisions and give you practice. As of this moment, you have been credited with the sum of £4, your STARTING CREDIT. During the course of the experiment you may, through the decisions you make, either add to this, leave it unchanged, or lose some of it. The net amount to your credit at the end of the experiment will be paid to you before you leave the building.

Please wait for other participants.

INTRODUCTION

There are three kinds of decisions in all in this experiment: INTERACTIVE DECISIONS, LIKELIHOOD DECISIONS and GUESSING DECISIONS. We will call them I DECISIONS, L DECISIONS and G DECISIONS for short.

Everyone will make some I DECISIONS, and each of you will make either some L DECISIONS or some G DECISIONS.

None of your decisions will be revealed by us to other participants either during the experiment or after it.

In your I Decisions (I for Interactive) you will be paired with another participant, your OPPOSITE NUMBER in that decision. In each I Decision you will have a different Opposite Number. You will not be told who your Opposite Number is, either during the I Decision or later. Nor will your Opposite Number know that it is you that she/he is interacting with.

We'll now explain the decisions you will make in more detail, give you some practice on them, and ask some questions to make sure everything is clear to you. We begin with I Decisions.

At any stage of the explanation, and throughout the experiment, you will be able to return to a HELP page which summarizes what you have been told so far, by clicking the button marked HELP.

I DECISIONS

In an I Decision, you choose between two OPTIONS, and your Opposite Number also chooses between two Options. Before making your choice you see a POINT TABLE like the one above. In it, we have labelled your Options TOP and BOTTOM, and your Opposite Number's LEFT and RIGHT.

The numbers in the table show the number of POINTS you and your Opposite Number would get, for various combinations of choices by you and her/him; the one on the left of the comma, in blue, shows YOUR payoff, and the one on the right of the comma, in grey, shows your Opposite Number's. In this example, if the Option you chose was BOTTOM and the one your Opposite Number chose was RIGHT, you would get 1.5 Points and she/he would get 0.5 Points. Notice that what you get depends on what you both choose. BOTTOM gets you more points if your Opposite Number chooses RIGHT, but fewer if your Opposite Number chooses LEFT.

At the end of the experiment participants will be paid in money for one of the I Decisions they make in Stages 1 and 2. The more points a participant scores the more she/he will be paid. We will explain how the payment is determined in more detail a little later.

We'll now ask you a few questions to make sure you are clear about what I Decisions are and what Point Tables show. After you have entered your answer, you will be given the correct answer and an explanation. If you need further help, please raise your hand.

[Subjects were presented with the following game:

	<i>LEFT</i>	<i>RIGHT</i>
<i>TOP</i>	1.5, 0.5	1.0, 2.0
<i>BOTTOM</i>	0, 2.5	1.5, 0.5

and asked the following questions: if their answer was wrong, they were told: "FALSE! The correct answer is " and the corresponding answer. If they were right they were told: "TRUE! " and the corresponding answer).]

(Question 1) What would you get if you chose TOP and your Opposite Number chose LEFT? Enter a number in the box.

(Answer 1) 1.5, because this is the BLUE number in the TOP row and the LEFT column.

(Question 2) What is the worst possible outcome for you in terms of Points if you chose BOTTOM?

(Answer 2) 0. If you chose BOTTOM you would get 0 if your Opposite Number chose LEFT and 1.5 if she/he chose RIGHT, and 0 is less than 1.5.

(Question 3) What is the worst possible outcome for you in terms of Points if you chose TOP?

(Answer 3) 1. If you chose TOP you would get 1.5 if your Opposite Number chose LEFT and 1 if she/he chose RIGHT, and 1 is less than 1.5.

(Question 4) What is the best possible outcome for your Opposite Number in terms of Points if she/he chose RIGHT?

(Answer 4) 2. If he/she chooses RIGHT he would get 2 if you chose TOP and 0.5 if you chose BOTTOM, and 2 is more than 0.5.

(Question 5) Suppose you think your Opposite Number is equally likely to choose LEFT or RIGHT. Do you expect to get a higher payoff from choosing BOTTOM or TOP?

(Answer 5) TOP. If you choose TOP you think you will get 1.5 and 1 with equal likelihood, so your expectation is 1.25; if you choose BOTTOM it is only 0.75.

Ask for help by putting up your hand if you are puzzled. If you are happy, click on OK. *(Subject moved to next screen).*

Next, we explain what LIKELIHOOD DECISIONS (L DECISIONS) are, and give some practice on them. In Stages 1 and 2 you will either make L Decisions yourself, or you will interact with participants who do. In the latter case, your ability to make good I Decisions will depend on understanding how L Decisions are made.

L DECISIONS

In an L Decision (L for Likelihood), you are asked to report your opinion on how likely a certain UNKNOWN FACT is to be true. You do this as a percentage figure, called your REPORT. For example, if your Report is 50 percent, this means you think the chance that the Unknown Fact is true is 1 in 2. Similarly, a Report of 100 means you are certain it is true, and a Report of 0 means you are certain it is not true.

We will now give you a practice example in which the Unknown Fact is a simple fact about the world. (In the main part of the experiment, the Unknown Fact will be which Option your Opposite Number chooses.) Here is the example.

PRACTICE L DECISION 1: How likely do you think it is, on a scale of 0 to 100, that A CARD DRAWN FROM A COMPLETE WELL-SHUFFLED PACK WILL BE A SPADE? Use the mouse to move the pointer on the dial to show your answer. *(Subject gives answer).*

Please Press [CONTINUE].

In Stages 1 and 2 each participant who makes L Decisions will be paid for one of them. This payment is called her/his L-PAYMENT. It may be anything up to £3. The L-Payment is determined as follows. You begin with £3. After you have made your Report, an amount gets deducted from your £3 (your L-DEDUCTION) and you get paid what is left. The L-Deduction is calculated by a formula. If the Unknown Fact turns out to be TRUE, then the higher your Report was, the smaller is the Deduction, and the more you are paid. If it turns out to be FALSE, then the lower

your Report was, the smaller is the Deduction and the more you get paid. It is important to realize that YOUR EXPECTED L-PAYMENT IS MAXIMIZED IF YOU REPORT YOUR LIKELIHOODS CAREFULLY AND TRUTHFULLY.

This payment scheme is known as the Quadratic Scoring Scheme. The formula, and a full explanation of why it benefits you to report your likelihood carefully and truthfully, are available on request after the experiment (ask for the Handout).

Here's one more example. This time, we'll ask you to make a decision for 'fictitious money'. Imagine you have been given £3. We'll ask you to make an L Decision, then tell you whether the Unknown Fact in this L Decision is true or not, and the payment you would finish up with on this decision.

PRACTICE L DECISION 2: On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that THE RIVER AMAZON IS MORE THAN 3000 MILES LONG?

Remember, if you think that it's a toss up whether the Amazon is longer than 3000 miles, then you maximize what you expect to receive by a Report of 50%, if you think the likelihood is 75%, you maximize it by a Report of 75%, and so on.
(Subject gives answer).

The length of the Amazon is 3900 miles. Your Report was (*report amount*). Your deduction is therefore £ (*deduction amount*) and your L-Payment is £ (*payment amount*).

G DECISIONS

In a G Decision (G for Guess), you are asked to make a Guess about what your Opposite Number's Report in an L Decision was. Let us try out a G Decision. In this one, which is purely for practice, we ask you to imagine that you have an Opposite Number. Imagine that your Opposite Number has just made the following L Decision: 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that THE RIVER AMAZON IS MORE THAN 3000 MILES LONG?'. Now here is your G Decision:
PRACTICE G DECISION: Please make your GUESS what your Opposite Number's Report was.
(Subject gives answer).

In Stages 1 and 2 each participant who makes G Decisions will be paid for one of them. This payment is called her/his G-PAYMENT. The G-Payment rewards participants for the accuracy of their Guesses.

This is the scheme on which G-Payments are determined. You begin with an initial sum of money, and for every percentage point your guess is 'out' a deduction is made. But you cannot lose more than your initial sum of money.

THE I DECISIONS OF STAGES 1 AND 2

We come now to the Interactive or I Decisions that you will make in Stages 1 and 2. They represent a type of I Decision that is very common in real life. The BREB group is active in research into discovering how people make I Decisions of this kind.

In these I Decisions there are two people, a MOVER and a RESPONDER. The Mover can choose either MOVE or PASS. If she/he chooses Move, the Responder can choose between RESPONSE A and RESPONSE B, and which one he/she chooses affects how well or badly off both finish up. If the Mover chooses PASS, the Responder cannot affect the position of either.

Here's an example. Theo has a promising research idea, but lacks the resources to develop it alone. Theo has to decide whether to tell a potential collaborator, Alex, about the idea. If Theo does so, then if Alex decides to collaborate, Theo will benefit. However, once Alex is told the idea, there are ways in which Alex can do better for him/herself by not collaborating. Moreover, in this case, Theo will end up worse off than she/he was originally. In this example, Move is sending the research idea, Pass is not sending it, Response A is collaborating if you are told the idea, and Response B is not collaborating if you are told it.

In the real world we find a great variety of Interactive Decisions which have the form of Mover-Responder problems. In Stages 1 and 2 you will be asked to make choices in two different Mover-Responder problems, one in Stage 1 and one in Stage 2.

You will take your I Decisions for POINTS. At the end of the experiment you will be paid for an I Decision at the rate of £1 per Point. We will explain the payment procedure fully in a minute.

Some of you will be Movers and some Responders. Both Movers and Responders may win Points in their I Decisions, but Movers may also in some circumstances lose Points. Which role you play will be determined by your own choices in a lottery. We will now proceed to this lottery.

THE LOTTERY.

You will see a display of 10 'nonsense syllables'. The computer has assigned each of them, randomly, a code number between 1 and 80. No two code numbers are the same. You will be asked to choose one syllable. When everyone has made a selection, the participants with the four lowest code numbers will be assigned the Mover's role and the others the Responder's role. You will be shown immediately to which role you have been assigned. Please keep your role to yourself both during and after the experiment.

In each of your four I Decisions your Opposite Number will be a different person. You will not learn at any stage who your four Opposite Numbers were. Please choose one 'nonsense syllable'.
(Subject makes choice).

Please wait for your Role Assignment.
(Role is assigned).

[PLAY STAGE: R PLAYERS]

You have been assigned the Mover role.

STAGE 1: GENERAL DESCRIPTION

This Stage has two ROUNDS. In each Round you face the same Mover-Responder problem, Problem 1. In each Round you will make an I Decision with a different Opposite Number. Your Point Table for Problem 1 is shown above.

Your I Decision is to choose between Move and Pass, and your Opposite Number's is to choose between Response A and Response B. But before you make your I Decision, you will be asked to make an L Decision. The L Decision is to decide on a Report, on the usual dial, of how likely you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A.

In thinking about this, you may like to consider what the procedure will be for people in the Responder role. Each Responder, before making his/her I Decision between Response A and Response B, will be given some information about the L Decisions of participants in the Mover role. However, this information will not include any about YOUR L Decision. Instead, your Opposite Number will be told the average Report of the three Movers other than you. For example, if you report the likelihood R_1 and the other Movers report the numbers R_2 , R_3 and R_4 , your Opposite Number will be told the average of R_2 , R_3 and R_4 , that is, $(R_2 + R_3 + R_4)/3$. (Your Report, R_1 , will be an ingredient in the average figures given to the Responders who are NOT your Opposite Number.)

To summarize, the procedure for you in each Round is as follows.

1. You make your L Decision, a Report about the how likely you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A.
2. Your Opposite Number is told the average of the L Decisions of all Movers except you.
3. You make your I Decision between Move and Pass. At the same time as this your Opposite Number is asked to make his/her I Decision between Response A and Response B.

Nobody will be told anything about anyone else's I Decisions until the end of the experiment. So you will learn nothing about outcomes of your I Decisions or of your L Decisions until the end.

Like Stage 1, Stage 2 consists of two Rounds, in each of which you make an L Decision and an I Decision. In each Round you will have an Opposite Number with whom you have not previously interacted in the experiment. The only difference from Stage 1 is in the Mover-Responder problem, which is a different variant, Problem 2, with a different Point Table.

At the end of the experiment your total payment will be determined as follows. The computer programme will randomly choose one of the four rounds of Stages 1 and 2 as your L-PAYMENT ROUND, and a different round as your I-PAYMENT ROUND. You will be reminded of your L Decision in your L-Payment Round and

shown the actual choice of your Opposite Number in that round and your resulting L-Payment. You will be reminded of your I Decision in your I-Payment Round and shown the choice of your Opposite Number in that round and the number of Points you scored, which may be positive or negative. Your final payment will be the sum of

- your Starting Credit of £4,
- your L-Payment in your L-Payment Round,
- the Points you scored in your I Decision in your I-Payment Round, which may be positive or negative, converted into money at £1 per Point.

When everyone is ready, we will begin Round 1 of Stage 1. You may have to wait one or two minutes for others to be ready. We ask you to be patient. Be sure you have understood the whole procedure, referring to Help if you wish to, before clicking on Continue. Put up your hand if you need any further help.

(Loop here after Round 1:)

(Screen after waiting period for Round 1:)

Please look at the Point Table for your I Decision presented above. You will be asked to say, on a scale of 0 to 100, how likely you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A

(Screen after waiting period for Rounds 2 and 4:)

In this Round's I-Decision you have a new Opposite Number. Your Point Table is unchanged, as shown above. Please look at it. In a moment you will be asked to say, on a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A.

(Screen after waiting period for Round 3:)

This Stage is just like the last one except that the I Decision is for a different Mover-Responder problem, Problem 2. Your Point Table for Problem 2 is the one shown above. Please look at it carefully. If you wish to compare it with the one for Problem 1, you can view the latter by clicking the button marked Problem 1. In a moment, you will be asked how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A.

YOUR L DECISION FOR THIS ROUND.

On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A? If this Round turns out to be your L-Payment Round, you will be paid for your Report in the way we have explained. It therefore pays you to report accurately. Try to make a decision within a few minutes. But do not rush, and ask help if you need it. When everyone has decided, we will proceed to your I Decision.

If you need to consult the Table press the 'TABLE' Button

(Subject gives answer).

Please wait for other participants.

(Screen after waiting period:)

YOUR I DECISION FOR THIS ROUND.

Your Opposite Number has now been told the average Report of all the Movers but you, and is now making her/his I Decision for this round. We remind you that the Point Table for the I Decision is the one shown above. Please look at it carefully.

Choose between Move and Pass. Do not rush, but try to make a decision within a few minutes. When everyone has decided, we will proceed to the next Round.

(Subject makes choice).

Please wait for other participants.

(After all participants have finished this round, the process repeats itself from (Loop here after Round 1:) until the end of Round 4)

[PLAY STAGE: E PLAYERS]

You have been assigned the Responder role.

STAGE 1: GENERAL DESCRIPTION

This Stage has two ROUNDS. In each Round you face the same Mover-Responder problem, Problem 1. In each Round you will make an I Decision with a different Opposite Number. Your Point Table for Problem 1 is shown above.

Your Opposite Number's I Decision is to choose between Move and Pass, and yours is to choose between Response A and Response B. Before your Opposite Number makes her/his I Decision, she has been asked to make an L Decision. This is to make a Report on how likely she thinks it is that you will choose Response A.

In each Round, before you make your I Decision between Responses A and B, you will be asked to make a G Decision. This G Decision is to make a GUESS about your Opposite Number's L Decision -- that is, to guess her Report on how likely she thinks it is that you will choose Response A. For example, you might think that she has said you are pretty likely to choose Response A -- you might think she gave this a likelihood of 80%; or you might think she has said you are pretty unlikely to -- she gave it a likelihood of 20%. In the former case you would stand to gain most money by answering 80% in your G Decision; in the latter case by answering 20%.

To help you Guess we are going to tell you what actual people in the Mover role HAVE reported to us. We will not tell you what your own Opposite Number reported, but we will tell you the AVERAGE Report of the other three Movers in this Round. That is, if your Opposite Number reported the likelihood R1 and the other Movers report the numbers R2, R3 and R4, you will be informed of the average of R2, R3 and R4, that is, $(R2 + R3 + R4)/3$.

To summarize, the procedure for you in each Round is as follows.

1. Each of the Movers makes an L Decision, giving a Report of how likely she/he thinks it is that you will choose Response A.
2. You are told the average of the L Decisions of all the Movers except your Opposite Number.
4. You make your G Decision, your Guess about the L Decision of your Opposite Number.
5. You make your I Decision between Response A and Response B. At the same time as this, your Opposite Number is making her/his I Decision between Move and Pass.

Until the end of the experiment, nobody will be told anything about anyone else's I Decisions, and you will be told nothing about your own Opposite Numbers' L Decisions. Hence you will learn nothing about outcomes of your I Decisions or of your G and C Decisions until the end.

Like Stage 1, Stage 2 consists of two Rounds, in each of which you make a G Decision and an I Decision. In each Round you will have an Opposite Number with whom you have not previously interacted in the experiment. The only difference from

Stage 1 is in the Mover-Responder problem, which is a different variant, Problem 2, with a different Point Table.

At the end of the experiment your total payment will be determined as follows. The computer programme will randomly choose one of the four rounds of Stages 1 and 2 as your G-PAYMENT ROUND, and a different round as your I-PAYMENT ROUND. You will be reminded of your G Decision in your G-Payment Round. You will then be shown the actual L Decision of your Opposite Number in that round and your resulting G-Payment. You will be reminded of your I Decision in your I-Payment Round and shown the choice of your Opposite Number in that round and the number of Points you scored. Your final payment will be the sum of

- your Starting Credit of £4,
- your G-Payment in your G-Payment Round,
- the Points you scored in your I Decision in your I-Payment Round, converted into money at £1 per Point.

When everyone is ready, we will begin Round 1 of Stage 1. You may have to wait one or two minutes at this point. We ask you to be patient. Be sure you have understood the whole procedure, referring to Help if you wish to, before clicking on Continue. Put up your hand if you need any further help.

(Loop here after Round 1:)

(Screen after waiting period for Round 1:)

Please look at the Point Table above for this Round's I Decision. You will be asked to make a Guess about what your Opposite Number answered to the question: 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A?'

(Screen after waiting period for Rounds 2 and 4:)

In this Round's I Decision you have a new Opposite Number. Your Point Table is unchanged, as shown above. Please look at it. In a moment you will be asked to make a Guess about what your Opposite Number answered to the question: 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A?'

(Screen after waiting period for Round 3:)

This Stage is just like the last one except that the I Decision is for a different Mover-Responder problem, Problem 2. Your Point Table for Problem 2 is the one shown above. Please look at it carefully. If you wish to compare it with the one for Problem 1, you can view the latter by clicking the button marked Problem 1. In a moment, you will be asked to make a Guess about what your Opposite Number answered to the question: 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A?'

Please wait for other participants.

The average report of all Movers other than your current Opposite Number to the question 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A?' is __.

YOUR G DECISION FOR THIS ROUND. Your Opposite Number has just made an L Decision. It was: 'On a scale of 0 to 100, how likely do you think it is that your Opposite Number will choose Response A?' On a scale from 0 to 100, please make your Guess what her/his Report was. If this Round turns out to be your G-Payment Round you will be paid for this Guess, and the amount will depend on how accurate it is.

Try to make a decision within a few minutes. But do not rush, and ask help if you need it. When everyone has decided, we will proceed to your I Decision. If you need to consult the Table press the 'TABLE' Button
(Subject gives answer).

YOUR I DECISION FOR THIS ROUND.

We remind you that the Point Table for the I Decision is the one shown above. Your Opposite Number is now making her/his I Decision for this round. Please choose between Response A and Response B. Do not rush, but try to make a decision within a few minutes. We will then proceed to the next Round.
(Subject makes choice).

Please wait for other participants.

(After all participants have finished this round, the process repeats itself from (Loop here after Round 1:) until the end of Round 4)

[PAYMENT STAGE: R PLAYERS]

The Computer chose Round (*chosen round*) as your L-Payment Round and Round (*other chosen round*) as your I-Payment Round. The result is as follows:

In Round (*chosen round*) your Report of the likelihood that your Opposite Number would choose Response A was (*report amount*) and he/she chose RESPONSE (*A or B*). Your L-Payment is therefore (*payment amount*).

In Round (*other chosen round*) you chose (*Move or Pass*) and your Opposite Number chose RESPONSE (*A or B*). The Problem was Problem (*1 or 2*). Your I-Payment is therefore £ (*payment amount*).

Your Starting Credit was £ 4. Thus your total payment will be £ (*total payment amount*).

Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please wait for an experimenter to come to you.

[PAYMENT STAGE: E PLAYERS]

You have completed the session. You will learn your payoff when everyone has completed it. Please wait.

The Computer chose Round (*chosen round*) as your G-Payment Round and Round (*other chosen round*) as your I-Payment Round. The result is as follows:

In Round (*chosen round*) your Guess about your Opposite Number's Report of the likelihood you would choose Response A was (*guess amount*) and her/his Report was (*report amount*). Your G-Payment is therefore £ (*payment amount*).

In Round (*other chosen round*) you chose RESPONSE (*A or B*) and your Opposite Number chose (*Move or Pass*). The Problem was Problem (*1 or 2*). Your I-Payment is therefore £ (*payment amount*).

Your Starting Credit was £4. Thus your total payment will be £ (*total payment amount*).

Thank you for participating in the experiment. Please wait for an experimenter to come to you.

The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental Study

Raw Data: R Players

<i>Ses</i> ^a	<i>Sub</i> ^b	<i>Variant round</i>				<i>Statement</i> ^c <i>round</i>				<i>Choice round</i>			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1	R1	K	K	G	G	25	0	25	0	W	W	W	W
	R2	K	K	G	G	0	0	0	0	W	W	W	W
	R3	K	K	G	G	20	25	15	15	T	T	W	W
	R4	K	K	G	G	80	90	10	10	T	T	W	W
2	R5	K	K	N	N	5	5	5	5	W	W	W	T
	R6	K	K	N	N	13	95	2	3	T	W	T	W
	R7	K	K	N	N	25	25	30	10	T	W	T	T
	R8	K	K	N	N	0	50	0	90	W	W	T	W
3	R9	G	G	N	N	50	50	50	50	T	T	T	T
	R10	G	G	N	N	50	0	50	50	W	W	W	W
	R11	G	G	N	N	25	25	98	1	T	T	W	T
	R12	G	G	N	N	75	75	25	26	T	T	T	T
4	R13	N	N	G	G	0	0	0	0	W	T	W	W
	R14	N	N	G	G	10	0	35	25	W	W	W	W
	R15	N	N	G	G	20	30	25	25	T	T	W	T
	R16	N	N	G	G	0	10	10	5	W	W	W	W
5	R17	G	G	K	K	0	10	35	25	W	W	W	W
	R18	G	G	K	K	50	96	100	100	T	T	T	T
	R19	G	G	K	K	95	75	10	85	T	T	W	W
	R20	G	G	K	K	75	4	7	22	T	T	T	T
6	R21	N	N	K	K	15	35	65	55	T	T	T	T
	R22	N	N	K	K	20	10	12	8	W	W	W	W
	R23	N	N	K	K	25	10	90	50	T	W	T	T
	R24	N	N	K	K	1	20	75	60	T	T	T	T
7	R25	G	G	K	K	36	67	70	62	T	W	T	W
	R26	G	G	K	K	25	0	25	35	W	W	W	W
	R27	G	G	K	K	40	70	20	20	T	T	T	T
	R28	G	G	K	K	0	0	0	0	W	W	W	W
8	R29	N	N	K	K	50	25	50	29	T	T	W	T
	R30	N	N	K	K	90	90	80	40	W	T	T	T
	R31	N	N	K	K	33	25	15	33	T	W	W	T
	R32	N	N	K	K	65	65	65	65	T	T	T	T
9	R33	K	K	G	G	33	75	20	33	W	T	W	W
	R34	K	K	G	G	0	0	25	25	W	W	W	W
	R35	K	K	G	G	10	10	5	5	W	W	W	W
	R36	K	K	G	G	25	20	5	5	T	T	W	W
10 ^d	R38	K	K	N	N	0	88	80	100	T	T	T	T
	R39	K	K	N	N	20	20	0	0	W	W	W	W
	R40	K	K	N	N	75	90	100	50	T	T	T	T

^a Session number ^b Subject code ^c Expressed as a percentage

^d R37's computer failed

Raw Data: E Players

<i>Ses</i>	<i>Sub</i>	<i>Variant</i>				<i>Report^a</i>				<i>Guess^a</i>				<i>Choice</i>			
		<i>round</i>				<i>round</i>				<i>round</i>				<i>round</i>			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1	E1	K	K	G	G	33	8	11	8	50	37	16	58	F	V	V	V
	E2	K	K	G	G	41	38	13	3	35	30	10	0	V	V	V	V
	E3	K	K	G	G	35	38	8	5	30	40	10	100	F	V	V	V
	E4	K	K	G	G	15	30	16	8	10	5	10	40	V	V	V	V
2	E5	K	K	N	N	12	41	2	35	20	50	20	50	F	F	F	F
	E6	K	K	N	N	10	56	12	32	80	99	50	75	F	F	F	F
	E7	K	K	N	N	6	26	10	4	10	30	13	8	V	F	F	F
	E8	K	K	N	N	14	50	11	34	10	20	10	34	V	V	V	V
3	E9	G	G	N	N	50	25	41	25	50	25	33	25	V	V	V	V
	E10	G	G	N	N	50	33	66	42	0	0	0	0	V	V	V	V
	E11	G	G	N	N	58	50	57	33	35	43	50	40	V	V	F	F
	E12	G	G	N	N	41	41	57	25	5	15	50	30	V	V	F	V
4	E13	N	N	G	G	10	10	15	10	20	5	15	13	F	F	F	F
	E14	N	N	G	G	6	13	20	10	100	100	80	70	F	F	F	F
	E15	N	N	G	G	3	13	23	16	5	11	23	20	V	V	V	V
	E16	N	N	G	G	10	3	11	18	0	0	0	10	V	V	V	V
5	E17	G	G	K	K	74	60	47	44	26	70	47	4	V	V	V	V
	E18	G	G	K	K	58	58	48	49	60	50	50	50	V	V	F	V
	E19	G	G	K	K	41	29	39	70	36	34	35	64	F	F	F	V
	E20	G	G	K	K	49	36	17	69	73	27	75	70	F	F	F	F
6	E21	N	N	K	K	15	18	50	55	10	20	33	50	V	V	V	V
	E22	N	N	K	K	13	13	55	41	38	38	46	38	F	F	V	V
	E23	N	N	K	K	12	21	59	37	10	25	40	40	V	V	V	V
	E24	N	N	K	K	20	21	76	39	20	20	70	75	V	F	F	F
7	E25	G	G	K	K	21	45	31	27	50	50	25	25	V	V	V	V
	E26	G	G	K	K	25	23	38	32	21	18	31	26	V	V	V	V
	E27	G	G	K	K	20	45	15	39	23	15	24	15	F	V	F	F
	E28	G	G	K	K	33	22	30	18	0	0	0	0	V	V	V	V
8	E29	N	N	K	K	62	46	65	42	75	25	65	65	V	V	V	V
	E30	N	N	K	K	49	60	48	44	25	60	50	50	V	F	V	V
	E31	N	N	K	K	68	38	53	34	93	97	95	96	F	F	F	F
	E32	N	N	K	K	57	60	43	46	66	70	32	35	V	V	V	V
9	E33	K	K	G	G	11	28	16	14	30	30	30	25	F	F	F	F
	E34	K	K	G	G	22	10	16	21	40	40	35	35	F	F	F	F
	E35	K	K	G	G	19	35	11	21	15	15	10	10	F	F	F	F
	E36	K	K	G	G	14	31	10	11	20	50	25	20	V	F	V	V
10	E37	K	K	N	N	31	66	93	33	30	80	90	75	V	F	F	F
	E38	K	K	N	N	56	66	60	66	55	66	60	66	F	F	F	F
	E39	K	K	N	N	50	66	60	50	75	68	70	33	F	V	F	F
	E40	K	K	N	N	31	89	66	50	25	100	25	35	V	V	V	V

^a Expressed as a percentage